Lost in a Postmodern World...

Many of my posts pertain to the science and pseudo-science of Lost, but my background is really in philosophy. As my recent analysis of the Desmond Exception suggests, I think of the show as a postmodern work with a particular emphasis on existentialism. So I was a little surprised to find two bloggers -- I'll call them "Dick" and "Jane" -- arguing that the show was building to some unified metaphysical theory of life, the universe, and everything.

What follows are excerpts from our exchange. In fairness to Dick and Jane, I've edited and substantially shortened their posts to focus on the points I want to make, but I did my best to preserve the essence of their claims. I'm reproducing our dialogue here because I think it addresses some basic misconceptions about the relationship between postmodernism and metaphysics, and clarifies why I think of Lost as thoroughly postmodern.

Bigmouth: Lost is a postmodern story about postmodern themes, like Ulysses, Watchmen, and the Brothers Karamazov. Just my opinion, but I don't think the type of metaphysical unification that you both apparently seek is forthcoming.

Dick: I don't think the postmodernism of LOST excludes the metaphysical ambitions of the series. In fact, the clever ways they found to sustain these existential ambitions are a lot postmodern (and these "clever ways" are the entire show, itself).

Bigmouth: How could it not entail rejection of metaphysics? Postmodernism is notoriously hard to define, but I'm with Lyotard that such theories all share a mistrust of meta-narratives. This includes existentialism, which I've always understood to be anti-metaphysical. Why would you expect a postmodern work generally, or one specifically about existentialism, to offer a unified metaphysical explanation? That strikes me as antithetical to the whole exercise...

Jane: One of the reasons that people find such difficulty in identifying "postmodernism" may be the result of there being more than one "postmodernism." We have many postmodernisms at our disposal - the beauty of polysemy! Anyways, the notion that meta-narratives are to be mistrusted may be construed as a meta-narrative in itself - and hence, is to be mistrusted. What do you get when irony folds back on itself? Step through that door and find out.

Bigmouth: That part about "irony folding back on itself" is precisely what differentiates postmodernism from metaphysics, in my opinion. The former deliberately contains within itself the seeds of its own potential destruction. In fact, it's a common pattern in postmodern thought for one thinker -- say Nietzsche -- to attack metaphysics only to be accused of being a closet metaphysician by another -- e.g., Heidegger.

Jane: Postmodernism is quite good at planting the seeds of its own destruction. What about a rubric that's just as effective (if not moreso) in planting the seeds of its own resurrection and rebirth?

Bigmouth: That's postmodernism -- theories contain the seeds of their own destruction and rebirth as something new. Metaphysics, by contrast, seeks transcendent truths for all time, what Putnam calls the "God's-eye perspective." Perhaps it might help if you clarified what you mean by "metaphysics" because I'm not sure we're operating under the same definition.

Jane: By a "metaphysic" I mean a cognitive framework for understanding the world and the place we make for ourselves in it. As such, I would consider postmodernism to be a subset of metaphysics - with its own particular set of strengths and weaknesses.

In general I find postmodernism to be strong in deconstruction, examining power relationships, and pointing out how underlying assumptions often entail the "results" observed from such an assumed position. On the other hand, postmodernism is weak in constructive activities, including rebirth, mostly due to its refusal to establish a foundation of values and intentions to build on. (Some Buddhists would claim that continual death and rebirth can get tiresome over time.)

Whether [metaphysical] theories are "true" or not is beside the point: The world over, people employ categories (kinds) and impute essence/nature/spirit/causation in and from "kinds". At the very least, we have an apt description for human cognition, if not the world around us. It certainly gives me food for thought in considering the ontology of patterns themselves.

All of these constructions share something in common, and this might be the Unified Field Theory for Metaphysics: They all rely on metaphor. That is to say, we perform a translation of something very abstract (the Essence of Being) through something more concrete - in particular, through our direct experiences. Metaphor, of course, is foundational in Lost.

Bigmouth: Postmodernism is not a subset of metaphysics. I'm oversimplifying here, but the two approaches are pretty much opposed -- belief in one entails rejection of the other. (Unless you're some kind of Straussian, but that's a whole other can of worms.) Is it possible you and Dick mean something different when you say "metaphysical"?

You complain that postmodernism is weak on constructive activities. But whom do you have in mind with this claim? Existentialism and American pragmatism are both constructive postmodern responses to nihilism. You build on a foundation of "values and intentions" as you put it, but that foundation is always contingent and historical -- never metaphysical -- and therefore open to change.

You mention that metaphor is fundamental to Lost. I quite agree, which is why I think of Lost as a quintessentially postmodern work. Metaphors expand the realm of linguistic possibility -- a realm that's closed and fixed in a metaphysical worldview. At one point, rivers and bottles did not have mouths. You would have been speaking metaphorically to say they did. Now, of course, that metaphor has become literal truth.

Jane: Like I said, I consider a "metaphysic" to be a cognitive framework, not a transcendental truth, so we are already on different grounds. (I do this because regardless of whether "transcendental truths" exist or not, they can only be known to us through our cognitive frameworks.) And then there's the sticky matter of defining postmodernism. Perhaps you'd like to give that a go?

Because I view all cognitive frameworks as limited, I have adopted the strategy of employing multiple frameworks, which allows me to take the position of considering metaphysics (as you've defined it) and postmodernism as both true, to their respective extents. Postmodernism serves some intents and purposes well; metaphysics serves other intents and purposes well.

Bigmouth: I'm not sure what you mean by metaphysics as a "cognitive framework," but if it doesn't include transcendent Truth with a capital T, you're not talking about metaphysics. I'm reminded of a bit from the Howard Stern show, where they call and order a pizza, hold the sauce, cheese, and crust. You're basically saying "I believe in metaphysics, minus the metaphysics."

Jane, you may be the most postmodern person I know. Your whole approach to theorizing about Lost is postmodern, particularly the way you embrace ambiguity, which is a thoroughly postmodern value. When you say that you employ "multiple frameworks," you are speaking in postmodern terms. It really surprises me that you resist this characterization -- I assumed you were being deliberately postmodern!

As for defining postmodernism, I would reiterate Lyotard's claim that it is, by definition, the rejection of metaphysics. Really. For example, the American pragmatists called themselves the "Metaphysical Club" as a joke -- they were devoted to critiquing the nonsense of metaphysics and developing an alternative.

Dick: You said it right - "For example". We can only agree on one point: there was Modernism. What happens after that - now, for example - is still a rich field for multiple points of view. There are some good guys (contemporary philosophers) that even discuss IF we are in postmodernism. We don't need go that far, I agree, but this is just to give an idea about the giant task in defining the term. The cellphone is postmodernism. Gongora is postmodernism. Flash Mobs are postmodernism. And the point of view of the pragmatists about what should be the most venal definition of the postmodernism, well, I say it's like the pragmatists see the postmodernism - there's a thousand of another possibilities being discussed.

Bigmouth: My example was illustrative. What I said about rejecting metaphysics is equally true of Continental philosophers like Nietzsche and Heidegger. Again, this is the most basic definition of postmodern theory.

I think you're confusing postmodernity (i.e., what comes after modernity) with postmodernism (i.e., postmodern theory like Nietzsche and Heidegger). This may seem like a semantic distinction, but it's not. When I say Lost is "postmodern" I mean in the sense that it actually embodies the values of postmodernism, such as ambiguity and irony. The flashbacks also do a great job of illustrating a core tenet of postmodernism -- that we are historical beings through and through.

All of this is antithetical to a unified metaphysical account, which is why I have such a problem with the question you've posed. If anything, I expect Lost to mock such metaphysical pretensions, as Douglas Adams did by positing that the meaning of life, the universe, and everything was 42.

Jane: [The idea that metaphysics is about Truth with a capital "T" is] what many metaphysicians would have you believe! What they are actually doing is constructing "maps" of "being". For me, the question is not whether the map is "true" or not, but rather to what extent is this map apt? Furthermore, what value I can gain from employing such a map, and what sorts of systemic entailments unfold from its use in a population?

So, I don't know whether what I'm doing is "postmodern" or not, because I'm surely taking something from metaphysics (the maps produced) but I'm rejecting its a priori notions of how to use or consider the maps. So when you say postmodernism is the rejection of metaphysics, I do get a bit confused, because my approach is not to reject metaphysics but rather to use it differently. Take what works and turn the rest - I'm not sure that this is what postmodernists advocate.

I won't limit myself to a strictly postmodern approach - I won't limit myself to a single map of any kind! And isn't that ultimately the entailment of postmodernism - to come to a place of taking on perspectives that are antithetical and contradictory to postmodernism itself? The negation of negation leads to embracing.

I see in Lost an extension of the work begun by Joseph Campbell. Campbell's work was pretty much about creating a "unified field theory," that of myth. He goes to great lengths to describe how so many myths the world over share a common structure, that of the Heroic Journey. It should be quite clear that the Heroic Journey has been employed throughout Lost - from the very first episode, and throughout the series, for a variety of characters.

Bigmouth: Again, there's nothing particularly "metaphysical" about your approach. If anything, you have just deconstructed metaphysics. What you advocate is precisely what (some) postmodernists believe. Taking what works and abandoning the rest is philosophical pragmatism in a nutshell. Ideas are true because they are useful, not because of their correspondence with some underlying metaphysical reality. Welcome to the Metaphysical Club!

Joseph Campbell was what's called a "structuralist" because he sought one final framework for evaluating all myths. Lost is definitely influenced by Campbell's insights, but I disagree that the goal of the show is a "unified field theory of myth." Rather, Lost is paying homage to Campbell as one intellectual influence among many -- i.e., minus the baggage of his structuralist ambitions.

Lost similarly refers to aspects of Plato's philosophy (e.g., the cave parable) even though the show doesn't subscribe to his metaphysical world view. This hodge podge of references is partly what makes Lost -- like Ulysses -- a quintessentially postmodern work.